The Court rejects compensation for violation of the right to digital disconnection, because this right does not have the character of a fundamental right and ratifies the lower court ruling determining that it is not appropriate to grant compensation for the violation of the right to digital disconnection.

The Social Court no. As a result of the situation, the worker had a psychiatric pathology that led him to be on medical leave due to a common illness. The claim is partially upheld and the employment relationship is declared terminated.

Both parties signed an employment contract with a start date of December 16, 2019 with the provision of services from Monday to Friday, with a working day of 40 hours per week, from 8:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. with a one-hour lunch break. In addition, the possibility of working additional hours was agreed upon, outside the hours established in the contract, if the company considered it to meet commercial needs. It is worth mentioning that as of March 20, 2020, the worker began to provide services in a teleworking modality and the company, with effect from June 15, 2021, made a statement to the entire workforce informing them of the imminent implementation of a working hours record.

During the year 2020, as established in the lower court ruling, it is found that the worker sent a total of 10,971 emails, part of which were sent during weekends and at times between 5:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m.

In its defense, the company in the Chamber alleged that it had not committed any violation and added that IT's situation did NOT derive from a professional contingency. It also pointed out that there was NO proven moral harassment or business behavior that damaged the physical or moral integrity of the worker.

The worker, based on the facts proven in the trial, filed a complaint with the Labor Inspection in 2021. In the issued report he confirmed that the company did not have a record of working hours nor had it carried out an evaluation of psychosocial risks... requiring the company to develop an internal policy to safeguard the right to digital disconnection.

Both in the instance and in the TSJ, it was recognized that the excessive workload contributed to the development of the disease from which the worker had not yet recovered. However, both Courts determined that no fundamental rights were infringed, so the additional compensation of €120,000 requested was not applicable. They argued that the right to digital disconnection is NOT included as a fundamental right in our Constitution, since it appears in article 40.2 EC as part of the “Guiding Principles of social and economic policy”, although it IS recognized in the law of the European Union (art 31.2 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights).

What's more, the worker did not inform the company that he had any problem or difficulty at work, the pathology diagnosed as a common illness, a non-professional contingency, having been treated, without any claim regarding modification of the contingency. Therefore, the Court could not uphold the plaintiff's claims and ruled out any violation of the right to privacy as there were no corporate actions aimed at harming the worker. Likewise, the Social Court No. 8 of Barcelona did not incur any constitutional infraction that would justify the revocation of its decision.